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IV

JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-22(3)0) (1998).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
The following issues of law are raised by defendant/appellant Lora Green as error
in her appeal from the rulings and orders of the district court:
1.

Did the trial court commit error in denying Lora Green's motion for partial

summary judgment that: (A) the Consent To Settle exclusion is unenforceable because it
violated the underinsured motorist scheme mandated by statute in Utah Code Ann.
§§ 31A-22-302 (l)(c) and 31A-22-305 (1) , (8), (9) and (10), as amended; and (B) under
§ 31A-22-305(10)(c)(i) and the policy language, she is entitled to stack each of the
underinsured motorist coverage policy limits contained in her two Utah insurance policies
issued by State Farm? Review by this Court is under the correctness standard. Rushton v.
Salt Lake County. 977 P.2d 1201, 1203 (Utah 1999); Alf v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.. 850
P.2d 1272,1274 (Utah 1993).
PRESERVATION OF ISSUES IN THE TRIAL COURT:

These issues were

preserved at the trial court in Lora Green's Memorandum in Support of Her Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment filed on April 20, 1999, R. 674-678; 684-690, her Reply
Memorandum, filed on May 24, 1999, R. 924-946, in oral argument which occurred on
November 1, 1999, R. 2876:24-31, and in Lora Green's Memorandum in Opposition to

State Farm's Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment and In Support of Green's
Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment, filed on June 28, 2000. R. 2271-2285.
2.

Did the trial court err in granting State Farm's motion for summary judgment,

ruling that the Consent To Settle exclusion was enforceable, did not violate public policy
and was not inconsistent with the statute-mandated underinsured motorist scheme under
Utah Code Ann. §§ 31A-22-302 (l)(c ) and 31A-22-305 (1), (8), (9) and (10), as amended?
Review by this Court is under the correctness standard. Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 977
P.2d 1201, 1203 (Utah 1999); Racklev v. Fairview Care Ctrs., Inc., 970 P.2d 277, 280
(Utah App. 1998).
PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUE IN THE TRIAL COURT: This issue was
preserved at the trial court in Lora Green's Memorandum in Support of her Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment filed on April 20, 1999, R. 674-678; 684-690, her Reply
Memorandum filed on May 24, 1999, R. 924-946, her Memorandum in Opposition to
State Farm's Motion for Summary Judgment filed on June 7, 1999, R. 1239-1256, in oral
argument which occurred on November 1, 1999, R. 2876: 25-27, and in Lora Green's
Memorandum in Opposition to State Farm's Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment
and In Support of Green's Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment, filed on June 28,
2000. R. 2271-2285.
3.

Assuming the Consent To Settle exclusion is enforceable:
a.

Did the trial court commit error by ruling that the policy language

regarding the Consent To Settle exclusion is not vague and ambiguous? Review by
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this Court is under the correctness standard. Alf v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 850
P.2d 1272,1274 (Utah 1993).
PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUE IN THE TRIAL COURT: This issue was
preserved at the trial court in Lora Green's Memorandum in Support of Her Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment filed on April 20, 1999, R. 678-683, in oral argument which
occurred on November 1, 1999, R. 2876:30-31, and in Lora Green's Memorandum in
Opposition to State Farm's Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment and In Support of
Green's Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment, filed on June 28, 2000. R. 2271-2285.
b.

Did the trial court err by ruling as a matter of law that there was no

genuine issue of material fact on the question of whether Lora Green's settlement
with Marlene Murray impaired State Farm's rights of subrogation? Review by this
Court is under the correctness standard. Mast v. Oversow 971 P.2d 928, 931 ^Utah
App. 1998).
PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUE IN THE TRIAL COURT: This issue was
preserved at the trial court in Lora Green's Memorandum in Opposition to State Farm's
Motion for Summary Judgment filed on June 7, 1999, R. 1239-1256, in oral argument
which occurred on November 1, 1999, R. 2876:27-30, and in Lora Green's Memorandum
in Opposition to State Farm's Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment and In Support of
Green's Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment, filed on June 28, 2000. R. 2271-2285.
c.

Did the trial court commit error by ruling as a matter of law that there

was no genuine issue of material fact on the question of whether State Farm knew or
should have known of the proposed settlement between Lora Green and Marlene
3

Murray and, whether State Farm acted reasonably in failing to give its written
consent to the settlement? Review by this Court is under the correctness standard.
Mast v. Overson. 971 P.2d 928. 931 (Utah App. 1998).
PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUE IN THE TRIAL COURT: This issue was
preserved at the trial court in Lora Green's Memorandum in Opposition to State Farm's
Motion for Summary Judgment filed on June 7, 1999, R. 1239-1256, in oral argument
which occurred on November 1, 1999, R. 2876:25-30; 36-37, and in Lora Green's
Memorandum in Opposition to State Farm's Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment
and In Support of Green's Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment, filed on June 28,
2000. R. 2271-2285.
cL:

Did the trial court err by ruling as a matter of law that State Farm had

not waived nor was otherwise estopped from asserting the Consent To Settle
exclusion to deny underinsured motorist coverage to Lora Green? Review by this
Court is under the correctness standard. Mast v. Overson, 971 P.2d 928, 931 (Utah
App. 1998).
PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUE IN THE TRIAL COURT: This issue was
preserved at the trial court in the Affidavit of L. Rich Humpherys filed on June 4, 1999, R.
1064, at f 12, Lora Green's Memorandum in Opposition to State Farm's Motion for
Summary Judgment filed on June 7, 1999, R. 1239-1256, in oral argument which
occurred on November 1, 1999, R. 2876:37-38; 48-49, and in Lora Green's Memorandum
in Opposition to State Farm's Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment and In Support of
Green's Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment, filed on June 28, 2000. R. 2273-2276.
4

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
1.

Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

2.

Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-302 (l)(c). (Effective in July 1995)

3.

Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305. (Effective in July 1995)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of the Case, Course of the Proceedings and Disposition Below

This is an action filed for declaratory relief by Plaintiff State Farm Automobile
Mutual Insurance Company ("State Farm"), seeking a court ruling that Defendant Lora
Green is not entitled to underinsured motorist ("UIM") coverage in her two Utah policies
of automobile insurance issued by State Farm. In each policy, the limit of State Farm's
UIM coverage is $100,000 per person. State Farm claimed that a Consent To Settle
exclusion contained in both policies excluded the UIM coverage for Mrs. Green.
In April 1999, defendant Green filed a motion for partial summary judgment
seeking, among other things, to have the Consent To Settle exclusion held unenforceable.
R. 386; 673-697. In a Minute Entry dated June 7, 1999, the Court found that there were
material issues of fact and denied Green's motion. R. 955-957. This ruling became a
formal order on December 10, 1999. R. 1492-1493. See Addendum 1.
In May 1999, plaintiff State Farm filed a motion for summary judgment. R. 899920. Defendant Green filed a Rule 56(f) affidavit to allow additional discovery before
the court ruled on State Farm's motion for summary judgment. R. 1062-1068. The Court
granted defendant Green's request for additional discovery on a limited basis, and denied
5

State Farm's motion for summary judgment without prejudice. R. 1523-1525. In March
2000, defendant Green filed a motion to extend the scope of discovery, R. 1814-1836,
which was denied except as it related to a very narrow inquiry of two witnesses. R.
2874:92; 2875:3, 7-8, 11-13, 15-16. State Farm renewed its motion for summary
judgment in May 2000, R. 1971-1988, which the Court granted in an order signed and
entered on March 5, 2001. R. 2850-2855. See Addendum 2. State Farm's claims for
declaratory relief against Marlene Murray were dismissed in February 2000, pursuant to
stipulation. R. 1531-1534.
Defendant/appellant Lora Green appeals both the denial of her motion for
summary judgment and the granting of State Farm's motion for summary judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This case involves underinsured motorist (f,UIMff) coverage. State Farm filed a
declaratory judgment action seeking to have the Court find that Lora Green was not entitled
to UIM coverage under her two Utah policies issued by State Farm because of a Consent To
Settle exclusion contained in the policies.
On July 13, 1995, defendant/appellant Lora Green was a passenger in a car driven by
Marlene Murray. Lloyd Louder was driving another vehicle in the opposite direction and
collided head-on with the Murray vehicle. Lora Green sustained severe personal injuries.
In October 1995, Lora Green filed a personal injury complaint against Lloyd Louder and
Marlene Murray, but did not serve it on Mrs. Murray because of the pending policy limit
offer and the subsequent settlement with Murray's liability insurer.
6

State Farm separately insured both Mrs. Green and Mr. Louder1 for their personal
automobile insurance. R. 694-696. Marlene Murray was insured through Horace Mann
Insurance Company with a liability policy limit of $25,000. R. 694; 605. State Farm had
issued three (3) separate automobile insurance policies to Lora Green. One was a California
policy which is not the subject of this action. The other two were Utah policies which
provided UIM coverage with separate policy limits of $100,000 per person. R. 607-671;
695-696. All of the above-mentioned policies were in full force and effect at the time of the
accident. Horace Mann tendered its policy limit of $25,000 in the fall of 1995 to settle Mrs.
Green's liability claims against Mrs. Murray. In February 1996, Mrs. Murray, through her
insurer Horace Mann, settled with Lora Green for the policy limit of $25,000.
Lora Green's Utah policies issued by State Farm contain an exclusion stating that
there is no underinsured motorist coverage,
FOR ANY INSURED WHO, WITHOUT OUR WRITTEN CONSENT.
SETTLES WITH ANY PERSON OR ORGANIZATION WHO MAY BE
LIABLE FOR THE BODILY INJURY AND THEREBY IMPAIRS THE
RIGHT TO RECOVER OUR PAYMENTS.
(R. 18) (Bold in original, underline added). See Addendum 3 for copy of State Farm's
policy regarding UIM coverage. The above exclusion, often referred to as the Consent To
Settle exclusion, formed the basis for State Farm's declaratory action herein.
A day after the accident, July 14, 1995, and again on July 17, 1995, Tim Green,
Lora's husband, gave notice to State Farm of the accident, the severity of his wife's injuries
1

State Farm, as Louder's liability carrier, claimed that Louder had no fault in the accident
and refused to settle Mrs. Green's liability claim. Lora Green pursued her claim against
7

and the fact that Marlene Murray was underinsured. R. 1667-1674. On August 1, 1995,
Jackson Howard, Lora Green's attorney, advised State Farm of Mrs. Green's UIM claim.
R. 1663. At the time, State Farm neither accepted nor denied Mrs. Green's UIM claim and
did nothing on the UIM claim until September 27, 1995, when it assigned an adjuster,
Bonnie Markham, to handle Green's UIM claim. R. 1657-1659; 2881:13, 62 (Markham).
State Farm also assigned JoAnn Hirase to handle Green's liability claim against Louder. R.
2883:7 (Hirase).
Contrary to representations made by State Farm to the trial court below, both
adjusters shared information and had some involvement in the handling of the other's claim.
R. 1723-1764; 1770, 1773, 1778; 1830-1833. For the first seven months, both adjusters
were supervised by the same person, John Sacks, a State Farm supervisor in the Orem, Utah
office. R. 2879:109 (Sacks).
Lora Green's attorney sent a letter dated October 9, 1995, to State Farm
documenting that her medical expenses and other special damages at that time exceeded
$45,000 and that she suffered permanent debilitating injuries, R. 1790-1791; 514-597,
which information was given to Bonnie Markham, State Farm's UIM adjuster. R. 1788;
1790. By mid-October 1995, State Farm knew that Marlene Murray's $25,000 policy
limit was insufficient to cover Lora Green's damages. Id.; R. 1775. Because State Farm
claimed Louder had no fault, it knew or should have known that Mrs. Green would also
have valid UIM claims based on Mrs. Murray's underinsurance.

Louder to trial, resulting in a jury verdict in favor of Louder. The verdict was affirmed by
this Court in July, 2001. See, Green v. Louden 29 P.3d 638 (Ut. 2001).
8

From Fall 1995 through February 1996, Lora Green's attorney Jackson Howard
advised representatives of State Farm that Horace Mann was tendering its $25,000 policy
limit and asked that State Farm quickly give its written consent to allow the settlement in
order to relieve some of Mrs. Green's financial stress. R. 693-694; 486-512; 468. State
Farm refused to give its consent, claiming that it needed to do an asset check on Mrs.
Murray to evaluate its rights of subrogation. R. 1653; 510; 488-489; 467-482; 17391764.
After numerous unsuccessful attempts to obtain State Farm's written consent to
settle, Jackson Howard called Bonnie Markham in January or early February 1996, and
told her Mrs. Green needed to settle, whereupon he was told to go ahead. R. 693; 457482; 493-512. Lora Green, suffering from financial stress, then settled her claim against
Murray for the $25,000 policy limit in February 1996. R. 452-455; 692-693. Thereafter,
State Farm denied her UIM claims based on the exclusion that required its written
consent to settle.
Below, Lora Green filed a motion for partial summary judgment, seeking a ruling
that: (1) the Consent To Settle exclusion was unenforceable; and (2) the UIM policy
limits of both her policies should be stacked for maximum coverage. R.673-697. The
trial court denied her motion. See Addendum 1. State Farm also filed a motion for
summary judgment, asserting that it was unaware that Horace Mann had tendered its
policy limit to settle the claim against Mrs. Murray. Accordingly, it had no opportunity
to consent to the settlement, and the Consent To Settle exclusion therefore precluded
UIM coverage. R. 899-920.
9

The trial court eventually granted State Farm's motion for summary judgment and
ruled that: (1) the Consent To Settle exclusion was enforceable; (2) State Farm was
unaware before the settlement that Horace Mann had offered the $25,000 policy limit; (3)
Lora Green had breached the insurance contract by settling with Marlene Murray without
State Farm's written consent, and (4) therefore, Lora Green was not entitled to any UIM
coverage. R. 2855-2850. See Addendum 2.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court should have granted Lora Green's motion for summary judgment and
ruled that the Consent To Settle exclusion is unenforceable for two reasons. First, the Utah
statutory law regarding UIM coverage neither provides for nor allows an insurer to add an
exclusion that would limit the mandatory coverage. The exclusion violates the purpose of
UIM coverage because it grants State Farm, in its sole discretion, the right to bestow, or not
to bestow, the UIM coverage required by statute. Second, the exclusion violates public
policy and is unconscionable. The UIM statute, the purpose of which is to protect innocent
victims of automobile accidents, reflects public policy. Under the exclusion, State Farm can
violate this public policy by imposing financial duress on the insured by withholding
consent to the settlement and forcing the insured to continue litigating against the
underinsured tort-feasor, thereby controlling the third-party claim, all with the sole purpose
of protecting its own financial interest at the expense of its insured.
The trial court should also have granted Green's motion for summary judgment to
stack each of the two UIM limits contained in Green's State Farm policies. The UIM statute
10

specifically allows the stacking of UIM limits under certain circumstances which apply
here, i.e., when an insured is injured while occupying a non-owned vehicle not regularly
used by the insured or the insured's family. Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305(10)(c)(i).
Furthermore, the State Farm policies do not preclude stacking.
Assuming the exclusion is valid, Mrs. Green is still entitled to recover UIM benefits
because the contract language precludes the application of the exclusion. The exclusion,
which requires an impairment of State Farm's Right to Recover, does not apply because the
facts of this case do not fall within State Farm's definition of "Right to Recover." At the
very least, the contract language is ambiguous and accordingly should be interpreted to
provide coverage. The principles of equitable subrogation do not apply because Mrs. Green
has not been fully compensated and State Farm's position is not a superior equitable position
to Mrs. Green who has paid a premium for UIM coverage and remains grossly
uncompensated.
If the exclusion is enforceable, State Farm must act reasonably in applying its right to
consent to the settlement. There are numerous issues of fact regarding this issue including:
(1) did State Farm know or it should have known of the pending settlement; (2) did State
Farm's dilatory and other unreasonable actions result in the failure to timely consent to the
settlement; and (3) was State Farm's subrogation right "impaired", i.e., did Mrs. Green's
damages exceed the amount of the settlement plus the collectable assets of Mrs. Murray?
These issues preclude summary judgment in favor of State Farm.
Finally, in light of State Farm's lack of investigation and other unreasonable actions,
State Farm should be estopped from enforcing the exclusion. State Farm's failure to do
11

anything during most of the eight-month period prior to the settlement, together with its
statement to Mrs. Green's attorney to proceed with settlement, constitute a legal waiver, or,
at the very least, a question of fact to be determined by the jury.
ARGUMENT
L

THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE GRANTED LORA GREEN'S
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
The trial court should have held that the Consent To Settle exclusion was

unenforceable and that the two UIM policy limits of $100,000 should be stacked for
purposes of providing coverage to Lora Green.
A.

The Trial Court Erred in Refusing to Hold the "Consent To Settle"
Exclusion Unenforceable.

The trial court determined as a matter of law that State Farm's Consent To Settle
exclusion, which required State Farmfs prior written consent to any settlement with the
tort-feasor before UIM coverage would apply, was valid and enforceable. The trial court
erred in this holding because (1) the Utah statute mandates underinsured motorist
coverage and does not permit such an exclusion; and (2) Utah public policy precludes
State Farm from asserting such exclusion to a statutorily mandated coverage.
1.

Under Utah's Insurance Code, UIM Coverage is
Mandatory and May Not Be Limited By a Consent To
Settle Exclusion.

In interpreting a statute, the court's "primary goal is to give effect to the
legislature's intent in light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve." Lieber v.
ITT Hartford Ins. Center. Inc., 15 P.3d 1030, 1034 (Utah 2000) (citation omitted). The
12

purpose of UIM coverage has been expressly stated by this court in U.S. Fidelity and
Guar. Co. v. Sandt 854 P.2d 519 (Ut. 1993):
Underinsured motorist coverage provides first-party insurance protection
for damages that exceed the limits of the tort-feasor's bodily injury
coverage. Underinsured motorist coverage is a facet of uninsured motorist
coverage; its purpose is to provide insurance protection to the insured
against damages caused by a negligent motorist as if the motorist had
another liability policy in the amount of the underinsured policy.
* * *

Since 1921 this Court has expressed its commitment to the principle that
"insurance policies should be construed liberally in favor of the insured and
their beneficiaries so as to promote and not defeat the purposes of
insurance.
Id. at 521 (citations omitted).
Section 31 A-22-302( 1) of the Utah Insurance Code states:
Every policy of insurance or combination of policies purchased to satisfy
the owner's or operator's security requirement... shall include:
* * *

(c) underinsured motorist coverage under § 31A-22-305, unless
affirmatively waived . . .
Id. (emphasis added). See Utah Code Ann. §§ 31A-22-302 and 31A-22-305, attached as
Addendum 4 and 5 respectively.
A policy issued by State Farm in Utah must comply with this mandated coverage.
Any provision of the policy which is inconsistent with or in violation of the statute, is
void. See, e ^ , Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Call 712 P.2d 231, 233-4 (Utah 1985) (although

2

All references to §§ 31A-22-302 and -305 of the Utah Code, are the sections effective
on July 13, 1995, the day of the accident.
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insurer may contract with insured as to risks it will or will not assume, insurer may not
violate statutory law or public policy).
Though the Utah Insurance Code expressly allows a carrier to provide greater
coverage than required by the statute3, the Code is bereft of any provision allowing an
insurer to provide coverages more restrictive than those provided by statute Case law is
clearly aligned with this concept. Farmers Ins. Exch.. supra, at 233-235.
One of the expressed purposes of the Utah Insurance Code is to "ensure that
policyholders...are treated fairly and equitably." Utah Code Ann. § 31A-1-102(2); see
also. Tanner v. Phoenix Ins.Co.. 799 P.2d 231, 233 (Utah App. 1990). The provisions of
the insurance code are to be liberally construed, in order to afford the maximum amount
of required insurance coverage to an insured. Derbidge v. Mutual Protective Ins. Co..
963 P.2d 788, 795 (Utah App. 1998) ("Statutes pertaining to representations in insurance
contracts 'are to be liberally construed against the insurer and in favor of the insured.'"
(citations omitted)).
The statute requires that UIM benefits be paid to an insured if the tort-feasor is
underinsured, as defined by Section 31 A-22-305(8)(a), which states:
As used in this section, "underinsured motor vehicle" includes a vehicle,
the operation, maintenance, or use of which is covered under a liability
policy at the time of an injury-causing occurrence, but which has
insufficient liability coverage to compensate fully the injured party for all
special and general damages.

See, e.g.. Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-303(l)(b), which provides that a policy may
provide terms more favorable to insureds than the statute requires. Section 31A-22303(2)(a) provides that an insurer affording liability insurance may grant coverage in
addition to statutorily required minimum insurance.
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Significantly, nowhere does the statute give the right or condition an insurer's duty
to provide UIM coverage upon the insured's compliance with a Consent To Settle
requirement imposed by the UIM insurer. The Utah Supreme Court has acknowledged
that "omissions in statutory language should be taken note of and given effect." Lieber,
supra, 15 P.3d at 1035 (citing Biddle v. Washington Terrace City. 993 P.2d 875, 879
(Utah 1999)). The operative language that triggers coverage in the statute is, "... a
vehicle ... which has insufficient liability coverage to compensate fully the injured party
..." Considerations, such as protecting the insurer's right of subrogation and the financial
worth of the underinsured motorist, are never mentioned and would represent an
inconsistent restriction of the mandated coverage.
Furthermore, the statute does not allow a UIM carrier to withhold or deny its
payment until such time as it verifies an underinsured tort-feasor's ability to financially
respond to subrogation. In fact, the statute does not provide any subrogation right4. To
the contrary, the Utah statute provides that
Underinsured motorist coverage may not be set off against the liability
coverage of the owner or operator of an underinsured motor vehicle, but
shall be added to, combined with, or stacked upon the liability coverage of
the owner or operator of the underinsured motor vehicle to determine the
limit of coverage available to the injured person.
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305(9)(b) (emphasis added).5

4

If there is an equitable right of subrogation, it cannot form the basis of restricting,
withholding, or delaying benefits required to be paid by statute. See Argument III.
below.

5

This language is currently codified in Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305(9)(e), and is
substantively identical to the 1995 statute.
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State Farm's exclusion is wholly inconsistent with this language. The statute does
not allow State Farm to condition payment of mandatory UIM benefits upon its
discretionary bestowal of written permission, nor upon its completion of an "asset check"
of Mrs. Murray, nor upon Mrs. Murray's ability to respond to a subrogation claim. To
the contrary, § 31A-22-305(9)(b) specifically provides that UIM benefits are secondary
only to "the liability coverage of an owner or operator of an underinsured motor vehicle,"
not the liability coverage plus the underinsured motorist's personal assets as well.
Once it has been established that the tort-feasor has "insufficient liability coverage
to compensate fully the injured party," there is nothing in the Utah statute or case law that
would permit a Consent To Settle exclusion. The statute is straightforward and simple.
The Utah policies issued to Mrs. Green must comply with Utah law. Accordingly, this
restrictive exclusion is void and the trial court should have granted Mrs. Green's motion
for summary judgment on this issue.
2.

The "Consent To Settle" Exclusion Violates Utah Public Policy
and is Unconscionable.

As stated above, one of the insurance code's expressed purposes is to ensure that
policyholders are treated fairly and equitably.

Furthermore, this Court has explicitly

recognized that an insurer's freedom to contract with an insured is necessarily limited by
public policy considerations. Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Call supra, 712 P.2d at 233. To be
enforceable, exclusions or limitations contained in an insurance policy must not violate
either statute or public policy. Id.
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Statutorily mandated coverages reflect Utah's public policy of protecting innocent
victims of automobile accidents. Id. at 234. See also, generally, Berube v. Fashion
Centre. Ltd.. 771 P.2d 1033, 1042-1043 (Utah 1989) (Public policy is "that principle of
law which holds that no citizen can lawfully do that which has a tendency to be injurious
to the public, or against the public good." Public policy is embodied in legislative
enactments which "protect the public or promote public interest."). Thus, public policy
precludes an insurer from placing conditions, restrictions, or exclusions on mandatory
coverages that are more stringent than those provided in the code.
It is also the long-settled public policy in Utah that actions between victims and
tort-feasors be settled or resolved as expeditiously as possible, without resort to
unnecessary litigation. See Fenton v. Salt Lake County. 4 Utah 466 (Utah Terr. 1886)
(judicious public policy avoids unnecessary litigation and expenditure of costs);
Scarborough v. Granite School District. 531 P.2d 480, 483 (Utah 1975). In addition,
public policy requires that an insurer give its insured's interests at least as much
consideration as it gives its own. Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.. 840 P.2d
130, 137-138 (Utah App. 1992). Insurers' attempts to enforce exclusionary clauses based
on their asserted fear of collusion have been held as insufficient to overcome public
policy protecting such innocent victims, and have been rejected by this Court.6 Id. at
236.
6

Although Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Call involved a household exclusion clause in an auto
policy, the court's rejection of the collusion argument is especially noteworthy in the
instant case, where State Farm has repeatedly asserted the risk of collusion as a basis for
the Consent To Settle exclusion. R. 2292; 1976.
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State Farm's Consent To Settle exclusion violates Utah public policy because such
exclusion allows State Farm to determine in its discretion when and if its insured can
settle with an underinsured tort-feasor, thus potentially forcing financial duress on its
insured to keep litigating or to accept a lesser settlement. Such exclusion is inherently
inconsistent with the implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing. Beck v. Farmers
Ins. Exch.. 701 P.2d 795, 801 (Utah 1985). Moreover, "courts endeavor to construe
contracts so as not to grant one of the parties an absolute and arbitrary right to terminate a
contract." Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch & Livestock Co., 706 P.2d 1028,
1037 (Utah 1985). The unjust result of such an exclusion is precisely that; i.e., State
Farm is given the absolute and arbitrary right to terminate a provision in Mrs. Green's
policy.
Furthermore, the exclusion would allow State Farm to effectively control the
settlement with the underinsured tort-feasor, even though it is not a party to the action.
State Farm would have the power to force its insured to continue litigating against an
underinsured tort-feasor who may be willing to settle for policy limits, all in the name of
protecting State Farm's "right of subrogation", i.e., State Farm's financial interest, at the
direct expense of its insured. Issues involving UIM coverage usually arise when the
insured has suffered substantial injury and loss.

Public policy favors an insured's

interests in resolving the case as quickly as possible. Medical providers, family members
and others may be dependent upon the financial resolution of the case. State Farm's
exclusion runs counter to all of these considerations.
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A primary purpose of insurance is to provide financial security to an insured, not
to protect the insurer's financial interests. State Farm has already been compensated for
the coverage through premiums paid. An insured should be provided all benefits for
which the insured has paid, and an insurer should act quickly and equitably to resolve its
insured's claims. Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exctu 701 P.2d 795, 801 (Utah 1985); Campbell
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 840 P.2d 130, 137 (Utah App. 1992). The only
justification and purpose of such exclusion would be to protect State Farm's financial
interests. In fact, the exclusion encourages an insurer to place its own interests above
those of its insured. There is nothing about the exclusion which protects the insured.
Such is without question a violation of public policy and cannot be allowed.
Furthermore, the exclusion must also fail under the doctrine of unconscionability.
Though this equitable doctrine is largely undeveloped in Utah, this Court expressly
acknowledged this doctrine in Allen v. Prudential Property and Casualty Ins. Co., 839
P.2d 798, 805-07 and n.13 (Utah 1992), and suggested the doctrine may be used as a
means to address inequitable results in the field of insurance.
Because Utah public policy and the doctrine of unconscionability would not allow
State Farm to impose a Consent To Settle exclusion, the denial of Greenfs motion for
summary judgment was error.
B.

The Trial Court Erred in Refusing to Hold That Green Is
Entitled To Stack Each of the UIM Policy Limits Contained in
Her Two Utah Insurance Policies.

Green submits that because the Consent To Settle clause is unenforceable as a
matter of law, the trial court further erred in failing to grant Green's motion for summary
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judgment that Green is entitled to stack the policy limits of her two State Farm policies in
determining the amount of available UIM coverage. Lora Green paid State Farm two
separate premiums for each of her Utah policies. Each policy contains a UIM coverage
limit of $100,000 per person. Under the UIM statute, these policy limits may be stacked
so that the total UIM coverage available to Mrs. Green is $200,000.
The Utah statute provides a qualified prohibition against stacking UIM limits for
two or more vehicles in a policy of insurance. It states:
The limit of liability for underinsured motorist coverage for two or more
motor vehicles may not be added together, combined, or stacked to
determine the limit of insurance coverage available to an injured person for
any one accident.
Section 31A-22-305(10)(b)(i), see Addendum 5. Subsection (b)(ii), however, expressly
states an exception to the above prohibition to stacking:
Subsection (b)(i) applies to all persons except a covered person as defined
under Subsection (c)(i)(B).
Section 31A-22-305(10)(c)(i)(B) provides for stacking of UIM policy limits
where, as applies here, the person who is making a UIM claim is injured in an unowned
vehicle, or a vehicle which is not available for the person's regular use or the regular use
of the person's spouse or resident relative. The operative language states:
(i)

Each of the following persons may also recover underinsured
motorist coverage benefits under any other policy in which
they are described as a "covered person" as defined under
Subsection (1):
* * *

(B) a covered person injured while occupying or using a
motor vehicle that is not owned by, furnished, or available for
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the regular use of the covered person, the covered person's
resident spouse, or the covered person's resident relative.
Section 31 A-22-305(10)(c)(i)(B) (emphasis added).
Under the facts of this case, Lora Green was a "covered person" as defined in
Section 31A-22-305(l) and (10)(c)(i)(B), and is therefore entitled to stack the UIM
coverage limits of all the policies she purchased that provided such coverage to her. It is
undisputed that the automobile in which Mrs. Green was injured was neither owned by
her, nor furnished or available for her regular use or the regular use of her spouse or other
relative living with her. Mrs. Green was a passenger in an automobile owned by her
mother, Marlene Murray, who did not reside with Mrs. Green. R. 699-701.
In the case of USF&G v. Sandt 854 P.2d 519 (Utah 1993), the Utah Supreme
Court has acknowledged the legislative intent to provide stacking in these circumstances.
Though the case addressed a different issue regarding UIM coverage, the court quoted
Senator Reese's statement contained in the legislative history:
HB14 [UIM statute] states that all underinsurance must be stacked on the
underinsured motorist's existing coverage always guaranteeing that the
consumer is buying protection through his or her purchase.
Id. at 526 (emphasis added). Consistent with the plain language of the statute and the
legislative intent behind the statute, Mrs. Green is entitled to stack the policy limits of her
two policies.
State Farm erroneously argued below that such stacking is eliminated by
Subsection 10(c)(iii), which states:
A covered person as defined under Subsection (c)(i)(B) is entitled to the
highest limits of underinsured motorist coverage afforded for any one
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vehicle that the covered person is the named insured or an insured family
member.
Given the express language allowing stacking in 10(c)(i), State Farm's interpretation
simply makes no sense. Subsection 10(c)(iii) clearly applies only to a situation in which
a "covered person" has more than one automobile covered under the same policy rather
than a "covered person" who has different policies covering different automobiles. State
Farm's interpretation makes the statute inherently inconsistent, and accordingly, must be
rejected. Lieber v. ITT Hartford Ins. Center. Inc.. 15 P.3d 1030, 1034 (Utah 2000). In
the instant case, Green paid separate premiums for UIM coverage on two separate Utah
policies. Under the clear mandates of the statute, such coverages can be stacked.
Even if the statute were silent on the matter, State Farm's policy language does not
preclude stacking of UIM limits from separate policies purchased by the insured. See
section of State Farm's policy entitled, "If There Is Other Underinsured Motor Vehicle
Coverage," Addendum 3, R. 17.
II.

EVEN ASSUMING THE "CONSENT TO SETTLE" CLAUSE IS VALID,
MRS. GREEN IS LEGALLY ENTITLED TO RECOVER UIM BENEFITS
BASED ON THE LANGUAGE OF THE STATE FARM POLICIES.
A.

Standard for Interpreting Insurance Policies.

An insured is entitled to the broadest protection reasonably understood to be
provided by an insurance contract. Fuller v. Director of Finance, 694 P.2d 1045, 1047
(Utah 1985). Ambiguities in an insurance policy are to be construed against the insurer,
and in favor of coverage. L.D.S. Hospital v. Capitol Life Ins. Co., 765 P.2d 857, 858
(Utah 1988) (citations omitted); Fuller, supra at 1046. If a term is susceptible to different
22

interpretations which are equally plausible, the term is ambiguous, and should be
construed in favor of coverage. L.D.S. Hospital at 860-61.
In determining whether a word or phrase in an insurance contract is ambiguous, a
court considers whether the language in the policy
would . . . be plain to a person of ordinary intelligence and understanding,
viewing the matter fairly and reasonably, in accordance with the usual and
natural meaning of the words in light of the existing circumstances,
including the purpose of the policy.
Id. at 858-59 (emphasis added); Draughon v. CUNA Mutual Insurance Society. 771 P.2d
1105, 1108 (Utah App. 1989). Accordingly, terms used in an insurance policy must be
given their usual and ordinary meaning.

See also Bergera v. Ideal National Life

Insurance Co., 524 P.2d 599, 601 (Utah 1974). The Utah Supreme Court has rejected an
insurer's argument that words in an insurance policy should be afforded an unusual
meaning. Mason v. Commercial Union Assurance Companies. 626 P.2d 428, 429 (Utah
1981).
B.

State Farm's Own Policy Language Supports Summary Judgment in
Mrs, Green's Favor,

The applicable language of State Farm's policies states:
THERE IS NO [UIM] COVERAGE:
1.

FOR ANY INSURED WHO, WITHOUT OUR WRITTEN
CONSENT, SETTLES WITH ANY PERSON OR
ORGANIZATION WHO MAY BE LIABLE FOR THE
BODILY INJURY ANT) THEREBY IMPAIRS OUR RIGHT
TO RECOVER OUR PAYMENTS.

23

R. 18 (bold in original, underline added). See Addendum 3. Assuming its validity, the
above exclusion applies only if State Farm's "Right to Recover [its] Payments" is
impaired.
An insurer's right to recover the benefits it has paid its insured is encompassed
within the principle of subrogation, which finds its foundation either in contract or in
equity.

Hill v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 765 P.2d 864, 866 (Utah 1988).

Contractual subrogation is strictly construed based on the language of the contract. Id.
Non-contractual subrogation is based on equitable principles as set forth in case law.
State Farm's "Right to Recover our payments" is specifically defined in the
section of the policy entitled "Conditions" which states:
3.

Our Right to Recover Our Payments
* * *

d.

Under underinsured motor vehicle coverage:
(1)
we are entitled, to the extent of our payments, to the
proceeds of any settlement the insured recovers from
any party liable for the bodily injury, other than
payments from bodily injury liability bonds or policies
made prior to our payment.
(2)

if the insured has not been fully compensated for the
bodily injury by the party at fault and we make
payment for the bodily injury,the insured shall:
(a)

keep these rights in trust for us;

(b)

execute any legal papers we need; and

(c)

when we ask, take action through our
representative to recover the amount of our
payments.
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We are to be repaid our payments, costs and fees of
collection out of any such recovery.
R. 11 (bold in original). See Addendum 6.
Based on State Farm's own language, State Farm's Right to Recover could only
apply to amounts that the underinsured motorist has paid, over and above the limits of the
liability policy. For example, presume that State Farm had paid $100,000 on its UIM
coverage and that instead of paying only the $25,000 policy limit of her Horace Mann
insurance policy, Mrs. Murray had personally paid an additional $10,000 cash to settle
the claim. Mrs. Green would then have received a total of $135,000, of which $10,000
would not be insurance money. The above language would allow State Farm to argue
that it has a right to recover the $10,000 of "personal payment" made by Mrs. Murray
(assuming Mrs. Green's total damages are $125,000).
What is confusing, however, is the language of subparagraph (1) above, "to the
extent of our payments", which implies that State Farm has made UIM payments before
the settlement, but it then excludes from its Right to Recover the amount of liability
insurance paid "prior to our payment" (emphasis added). This makes little sense because
the liability insurer would not pay its liability limits without a settlement of claims
against its insured. Thus, State Farm's Right To Recover seems to apply only to: (1) a
tort-feasor, other than the underinsured motorist who may be at fault and who settles after
State Farm has made UIM payments, or (2) a prior settlement with the underinsured for
an amount more than the underinsured's liability policy limit.
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State Farm provides in its policy that it is entitled "to the proceeds of any
settlement the insured recovers from any party liable for the bodily injury..." However,
State Farm clearly limits such recovery to proceeds which are obtained through
settlement which are "other than payments from bodily injury liability bonds or policies
made prior to our payment." (Emphasis added). By law, the UIM benefits are in addition
to the liability limits. Accordingly, State Farm cannot subrogate against the liability
limits whether they are paid before or after the UIM benefits are paid.

Obviously,

Subparagraph 3.d.(l) is unclear and ambiguous.
It is further important to note that under subparagraph 3.d. above, State Farm's
"Right To Recover [its] Payments" does not arise until after State Farm has actually paid
its UIM benefits. Both subsections d.(l) and (2) state clearly that State Farm's Right to
Recover applies to payments actually made, not to payments that will be made:
(1)

we are entitled, to the extent of our payments, to the proceeds of any
settlement....

(2)

if the insured has not been fully compensated for the bodily injury
by the party at fault and we make payment for the bodily injury, the
insured shall... [safeguard State Farm's "rights"].

R. 11 (underline added).
Based on State Farm's own definition of Our Right to Recover Our Payment, it
had no such right at the time Mrs. Green settled with Horace Mann for three reasons: (1)
there was no recovery above Horace Mann's policy limit; (2) Mrs. Green was not fully
compensated; and (3) State Farm had not paid Mrs. Green any benefits. Any one of
these three uncontested facts defeats a claim that State Farm had a Right to Recover. The
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policy conditions the application of the Consent To Settle exclusion on the impairment of
"our right to recover our payments," not "our potential right" or "right to recover our
future payments." Accordingly, by State Farm's own definition, there was no Right To
Recover, and the exclusion therefore does not apply. Mrs. Green had no duty to obtain
State Farm's written permission to settle since State Farm's purported Right to Recover
did not exist at that time. At the very least, State Farm's policy language is ambiguous,
and must be construed strictly against State Farm, the drafter of the adhesive contract.
III.

EQUITABLE SUBROGATION DOES NOT PROVIDE A BASIS TO
SUSTAIN THE TRIAL COURT'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
As discussed above, State Farm's contractual Right To Recover, is premised on a

strict interpretation of the policy language. The court below, however, seemed to focus
only on the impairment of State Farm's future right to recover its UIM payments from
Mrs. Murray's personal assets. Since the policy did not address the impairment of State
Farm's future right to recover, the only basis for considering such impairment must be
based on the doctrine of equitable subrogation.
The Utah Supreme Court addressed the underlying principles that apply to the
doctrine of equitable subrogation in the case of Educators Mutual Insurance Assoc, v.
Allied Property and Casualty Insurance Co.. 890 P.2d 1029 (Utah 1995). In that case, the
court summarized these basic principles:
Subrogation is an equitable doctrine that allows a person or entity which
pays the loss or satisfies the claim of another under a legally cognizable
Since State Farm had made no UIM payments, it had no present right to recover
anythug.
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obligation or interest to step into the shoes of the other person and assert
that person's rights.. . . Three equitable reasons are traditionally advanced
for permitting subrogation:
(1)
that the person who in good faith pays the debt or obligation of
another has equitably purchased (quasi-contractually), or is at least entitled
to, the obligation owed by the debtor or tort-feasor; (2) that the wrongdoer
(tortfeasor) is not entitled to a windfall release from his obligation simply
because the injured party had the foresight to obtain insurance; and (3)
that public policy is served by allowing insurers to recover and thus reduce
insurance rates generally.
However, "subrogation is not a matter of right but may be invoked only in
those circumstances where justice demands its application, and the rights of
the one seeking subrogation have a greater equity than the one who opposes
him." Subrogation is not permitted where it will work any injustice to
others."
IcL at 1030-1031 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
This Court further developed the equitable principles that apply to subrogation in
Hill v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.. 765 P.2d 864 (Utah 1988):
Subrogation is an equitable doctrine and is governed by equitable
principles. This doctrine can be modified by contract, but in the absence of
express terms to the contrary, the insured must be made whole before the
insurer is entitled to be reimbursed from a recovery from the third-party
tort-feasor. Noncontractual subrogation rights will only be enforced on
behalf of a party maintaining a superior equitable position, and the insurer's
equitable position cannot be superior to the insured's unless the insured has
been completely compensated.
Id. at 866.8
Based on the above principles, the trial court's ruling cannot be sustained . The
first reason for allowing subrogation (insurer pays the debt) does not apply, since State

8

It is interesting to note that in Hill though it was not involving UIM benefits, State
Farm was denied its right to recover its payments because the settlement was insufficient
to fully compensate the injured parties.
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Farm has not made any payment of benefits.

It is undisputed that Mrs. Green has

received no double recovery or windfall. The $25,000 settlement has not made her
whole. Likewise, equity is against State Farm on this issue, as described in Point LB.
above. Further, equitable subrogation is invoked only "on behalf of a party maintaining a
superior equitable position, and the insureds equitable position cannot be superior to the
insured's unless the insured has been completely compensated." Id.
Clearly, State Farm, having received a premium for UIM coverage, cannot claim
under these circumstances that equity demands a denial of UIM benefits.

On the

contrary, Mrs. Green's uncompensated damages are compelling. State Farm's refusal to
pay benefits works an injustice on her and others who are impacted through Green's
financial situation.
IV.

ASSUMING THE VALIDITY OF THE EXCLUSION, THERE REMAIN
FACTUAL ISSUES WHICH SHOULD HAVE PRECLUDED SUMMARY
JUDGMENT.
The trial court failed to address a number of factual issues which should have

precluded summary judgment, as addressed below.
A.

IF GREEN'S DAMAGES EXCEED MURRAY'S
COLLECTABLE ASSETS, STATE FARM'S RIGHT TO
RECOVERY ISN'T IMPAIRED IN ANY EVENT.

If the Consent To Settle exclusion applies, the court must determine whether State
Farm's Right To Recover was "impaired." In order to make this determination, several
specific factual findings must be made, which include:

(1) what are Green's total

damages; (2) what is the total "collectible" amount of Mrs. Murray's assets (excluding
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Mr. Murray's interest therein); and (3) do Green's damages exceed the amount of
Murray's collectible assets. If Green's damages exceed any collectible assets of Murray,
State Farm's Right To Recover would not be "impaired", since Green, not State Farm,
would be entitled to recover Murray's assets. State Farm's Right To Recover would not
apply until Green has been fully compensated.
To determine the factual issue of whether State Farm was impaired, the
assumption must be made that State Farm would not consent to the settlement. If State
Farm would have consented to the settlement, State Farm's position is moot. If it refused
to consent, Green would have been required to pursue her claim against Murray to a
judgment, at which time Horace Mann would then pay the policy limit of $25,000.
Thereafter, Green would be entitled to recover any excess judgment from the collectible
assets of Murray. If her judgment exceeded the amount of all collectible assets, Green
would still have a UIM claim against State Farm for the balance of her uncollected
damages.

Therefore, State Farm's Right to Recover could not, by definition, be

"impaired", and the exclusion would not apply. Even assuming State Farm's position is
valid on all other points, the issue of whether State Farm's Right to Recovery has been
impaired is an ultimate issue of fact which should have precluded summary judgment.
B.

Material Fact Questions Exist Regarding Whether State Farm
Knew or Should Have Known of Green's Proposed Settlement
with Marlene Murray, and If So. Whether State Farm Acted
Reasonably in Failing to Give its Written Consent to the
Settlement

The trial court acknowledged that State Farm had an implied duty to act
reasonably in giving or not giving written consent to settle, R. 1524-1525,
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however, it found that State Farm had not received actual notice of the proposed
settlement. Accordingly, State Farm could not have acted unreasonably as a
matter of law. The trial court's grant of summary judgment on this issue was error
because material fact questions existed with regard to whether State Farm knew or
should have known of Mrs. Green's proposed settlement with Mrs. Murray, and
whether State Farm acted reasonably in withholding its consent. If anything, the
facts favor Mrs. Green on this issue. Regardless, however, summary judgment
was not appropriate.
The accident occurred on July 13, 1995. The undisputed facts show that State
Farm was on notice of the accident and the possible UIM claim by July 14, 1995. R.
1674. State Farm expressly noted in its claim file on July 17, 1995 (three days after the
accident) that this case involved an underinsured motorist and Mrs. Green had sustained
"major injuries." R. 1674. It had sufficient information at that time to investigate a UIM
claim. Instead of promptly investigating, it closed its file on July 21, 1995. R. 16651672. Even after Mr. Howard had given formal notice of a UIM claim in his letter of
August 1, 1995, State Farm did not open a UIM file until September 27, 1995. R. 17841788. By mid-October, State Farm was aware that Green's medical expenses exceeded
$40,000, not to mention her lost income from her job as a biochemist. R. 1790-1791.
Though Mr. Howard had advised State Farm in August that the Horace Mann policy limit
was $25,000, by early October State Farm independently verified the limit directly with
Horace Mann. R. 1775, 1788. Shortly after the accident, State Farm had taken the
position that Murray/Horace Mann was the only liable party. The reality of a UIM claim
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against State Farm was obvious at least by October, and would have been obvious before
October if State Farm had fulfilled its duty to promptly investigate after receiving Green's
initial notice.
The facts that support Green's position that State Farm knew or should have
known of the pending settlement with Horace Mann are as follows:
a.

The adjusters testified that there was no need to do an asset search on the

underinsured motorist until there was a viable UIM claim, i.e., the liability carrier has
tendered its limits. R. 2881:42 (Markham). On October 31, 1995, State Farm assigned
attorney Ivie9 to perform the asset search on Murray. R. 1725-1764. Ivie did not follow
through with the assignment and on January 4, 1996, he admitted to Markham that he had
not yet performed the search. Id. State Farm then retained a third party investigator. Id.
The UIM claim file shows no activity by State Farm from July 21 through September 27,
and from November 8 until January 4.
b.

Jackson Howard filed the law suit against Murray and Louder in October

1995, but only served Louder.10 It would be obvious to Mr. Ivie and State Farm that,
given the liability of Murray and high damages of Green, a settlement offer for the policy
limits of only $25,000 would be made. This was even acknowledged by superintendent
Sacks in his notes dated November 8, 1995, wherein he gave directions to Markham as

Attorney Ray Phillips Ivie, who is regularly retained as State Farm's defense counsel,
was retained by State Farm to defend Lloyd Louder in Mrs. Greenfs third party claim. In
spite of this, State Farm also used Mr. Ivie to represent State Farm against Mrs. Green in
her UIM claim, which appears to be a conflict of interest given the duties of good faith
owed by State Farm to Mrs. Green in her UIM claim.
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follows, "Coordinate with Hirase concerning when [not "if] payment of limits occurs..."
R. 1723 (emphasis added). This clearly indicates that State Farm was shortly anticipating
the payment of limits by Horace Mann. There would be no mystery about the anticipated
settlement to an insurance company that would promptly and diligently investigate the
matter, rather than sit on the sidelines waiting to see what happened.
c.

The trial court seemed to disregard the testimony of Jackson Howard that

by the fall of 1995, he had given State Farm notice of the policy limit offer by Horace
Mann, because Howard could not specifically recall the exact times and people he talked
to at State Farm and because the State Farm people, who also admitted that they did not
have specific recollection outside of their file notes, had no record of such
communication. If Mr. Howard had not been trying to get State Farm's consent to the
settlement, why would he wait until February 1996 to settle when Horace Mann was
tendering its $25,000 limit months before? Why would Jackson Howard not have served
Mrs. Murray with the complaint if Horace Mann had not offered its $25,000 limit? Why
did State Farm request an asset search on October 31, 1995? Why would State Farm
superintendent Sacks direct Markham on November 8, 1995, to "Coordinate with Hirase
concerning when payment of limits occurs"? The evidence is consistent with Jackson
Howard's testimony that he tried to obtain State Farm's consent in the fall of 1995, but
State Farm was simply dilatory thereby forcing Green to eventually settle in February
1996, due to financial duress.

Louder was served in October 1995.
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On November 6, 1995, State Farm adjuster Bonnie Markham sent Mr. Howard a
letter which noted that State Farm at that time required verification of Horace Mann
policy limit (even though Markham had already verified the limits directly with Horace
Mann, R.1775), and that State Farm would need to do an assets check on Mrs. Murray
before any UIM claim could be considered. R. 1653.
Green submits that with the knowledge that State Farm had in the fall of 1995, it is
completely disingenuous to assert that it lacked notice of the proposed $25,000 policy
limit settlement. It was therefore unreasonable for State Farm to fail to give prompt
consent to Green and further unreasonable delay and then to deny UIM benefits based on
the lack of State Farm's consent. Again, these are clearly issues of material fact for the
jury.
V.

STATE FARM WAIVED AND/OR WAS OTHERWISE ESTOPPED
FROM ASSERTING THE "CONSENT TO SETTLE" EXCLUSION.
In light of State Farm's delay and failure to dutifully investigate and perform its

obligations under Mrs. Green's insurance policies, State Farm waived or is otherwise
estopped from asserting the Consent To Settle exclusion as a defense to Mrs. Green's
coverage. If State Farm can require written consent, it cannot unreasonably withhold it,
as it did with Mrs. Green.
As discussed previously, an insured must be provided all coverages for which the
insured has paid. The insurer must act promptly and equitably to resolve its insured's
claims. Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch.. 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985); Campbell v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 840 P.2d 130 (Utah App. 1992).
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State Farm had more than enough time to investigate the UIM claim.

From

July 17, 1995, when it first noted the possible UIM claim, to the settlement in February
1996, State Farm could have easily verified all of the facts necessary to extend coverage.
Instead, State Farm chose to close its files, wait more than two months to open the UIM
file, and then do little or nothing over the next four and one-half months to independently
obtain any needed information. State Farm cannot take this approach without waiving its
rights (if any) to enforce the Consent To Settle provision. Waiver would apply to a
company that sits back, does not fulfill its duties and delays addressing the consent to
settle. See, e.g., Lambert v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 576 So.2d 160 (Ala.
1991). See also Soter's v. Deseret Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n, 857 P.2d 935, 942
(Utah 1993) (noting that where there is a duty or obligation to speak, failing to speak may
constitute waiver).
State Farm further waived its right to enforce the Consent To Settle exclusion
when a State Farm adjuster implicitly consented to the settlement when she told Green's
attorney Jackson Howard to go ahead and "do what you have to do" concerning settling
with Mrs. Murray.

R. 693, 457-482; 493-512. Soter's. 857 P.2d at 940. (A distinct

intention to relinquish a known right constitutes waiver). In Soter's. the Utah Supreme
Court clarified that the intent to relinquish a right must be distinct, although it may be
express or implied. Id. at 940. Under this legal standard, "a fact finder need only
determine whether the totality of the circumstances 'warrants the inference of
relinquishment.5" Id. at 942 (citation omitted).
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Under the totality of circumstances in the instant case, there are questions of fact
as to whether by its words and inaction State Farm waived its right to enforce the Consent
To Settle exclusion. This is consistent with one of the cases previously relied on by State
Farm during the summary judgment proceedings, State Farm v. Blanco, 617 N.Y.S.2d
898 (A.D. 1994). In that case, the court stated that if the "insured can demonstrate that
the insurer, either by its conduct, silence, or unreasonable delay, waived the requirement
of consent or acquiesced in the settlement," the exclusion does not apply. Id at 899. In
the instant case, State Farm's conduct and unreasonable delay in handling Mrs. Green's
claim would warrant a finding of waiver or would otherwise estop State Farm from
enforcing the written consent requirement.
CONCLUSION
The trial court's declaratory judgment in favor of State Farm should be reversed and
remanded with directions that summary judgment should be entered in favor of Mrs. Green.
The Court should hold the Consent To Settle exclusion unenforceable and that Mrs. Green's
two UIM policy limits of $100,000 each may be stacked for purposes of determining her
UIM coverage.
In the alternative, assuming the Consent To Settle exclusion is enforceable, the Court
should find that the applicable policy language is vague and ambiguous or that State Farm
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has waived or is estopped from enforcing the exclusion. Accordingly, the Court should
construe that Mrs. Green is entitled to UIM coverage. At the very least, the Court should
hold there are genuine issues of material of fact for trial. Summary judgment should
therefore be reversed.
DATED this / / c t e y of January, 2002.
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C.
/->

L. Rich Humonervsv
>
Humpnerysy
Charles M. Lyons *
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant Lora Green
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Order on Defendant Lora Green's Motion for Summary Judgment

2.

Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment Date: March 5,
2001

3.
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VEHICLE - COVERAGE W.

4.

Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-302 (1995)
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Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305 (1995)
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State Farm's Insurance Policy, CONDITIONS
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FILED
Fourth Jud.c.al D.stnct Court
of Utah County, State ot Utah

RICHARD K. GLAUSER, #4324
ALBERT W. GRAY, #A6095
SMITH & GLAUSER, P.C.
Parkview Plaza, Suite 410
2180 South 1300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
(801)466-4228
Attorneys for State Farm

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE FARM MUTUAL
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Plaintiff,

]i
]>
]>
]

V.

>

LORA GREEN and MARLENE
MURRAY,

i
]
;I

Defendants.

ORDER ON DEFENDANT LORA
GREEN'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Case No. 96-0400447
Judge James R. Taylor

]

This matter came before the Court on Defendant Lora Green's Motion for Summary
Judgment. The Court having reviewed the Memorandum in Support in Opposition of the
Motion and having determined the general and material facts, now makes and enters the
following:
ORDER
Defendant Lora Green's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby denied.
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DATED this l&

day of NoveTffl5e*r, 1999.

APPROVED AS TO FORM

<icn Numphery^
CHRISTENSEN & JEf
Attorneys for Defendants
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Tab 2

RLED
Fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah County. State of Utah
—

Deputy

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Company,
Plaintiff

:

vs.

:

Order Granting Plaintiff s Motion
For Summary Judgment
Date: March 5,2001

Lora Green and Marlene Murray,

:

Case Number: 960400447

:

Defendant

Division V: Judge James R. Taylor

Plaintiff, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, filed this action seeking a
declaration that defendant Lora Green was not entitled to underinsured motorist benefits under
her Utah policies with State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company on the grounds that
she violated the policies when she settled all claims against Marlene Murray, Green's mother, and
executed a complete release of Murray without the prior written consent of State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Company.
Plaintiff, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, filed a motion for summary
judgment in May of 1999. The matter was fully briefed, Defendant Lora Green, filed a motion to
allow additional discovery before State Farm's summary judgment was ruled upon pursuant to
Rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court granted Green's motion for
additional discovery under Rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and denied Plaintiffs
motion for summary judgment with the understanding that the motion could be renewed at the
end of the additional discovery. The Court at that time specifically found that the "consent to
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settle" clause was valid and directed the defendant to conduct additional discovery from
employees of State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company as to whether a settlement
limits offer from Marlene Murray's insurance carrier (Horace Mann) had been communicated to
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company and State Farm had been allowed an
opportunity to give or deny consent.
Thereafter, extensive discovery was undertaken by counsel for Green. At the conclusion
of that extensive discovery, Plaintiff, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company,
renewed its motion for summary judgment. After the matter was fully briefed, the motion again
came on for hearing on November 16, 2000. At that hearing, defendant again requested
additional discovery and specifically requested discoveryfromJoann Hirase and attorney Phil Ivie,
who were the adjuster and the attorney defending Lloyd Louder in a lawsuitfiledagainst him and
Marlene Murray by Lora Green. At that hearing, David Mortensen, counsel for Louder, appeared
arguing that the file was protected and privileged but represented as an officer of the Court that
there was nothing in thefileto indicate that Marlene Murray's policy limits settlement offer had
been communicated to anyone handling the Louder file. Louder's counsel displayed what he
considered to be relevant portions of thefileto the Court. The Court reviewed those portions of
thefilein camera (with the understanding that no privileges on behalf of Mr. Louder would be
waived), whichfileincluded the log notes of Joann Hirase which the Court indicated showed no
notice to State Farm that an offer of policy limits had been made by Murray to Green. The Court
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further indicated that it wanted to give Green every opportunity to come up with some evidence
that the policy limit offer by Marlene Murray had been communicated to State Farm prior to the
time the settlement occurred. Therefore, another hearing was scheduled for November 28, 2000
and counsel for Green was allowed in open Court to inquire of Joann Hirase and attorney Phil Ivie
whether Murray's policy limit demand was ever communicated to them prior to the time that
Green settled with Murray.
The third hearing was held on November 28, 2000. Attorney Phil Ivie appeared and
testified that Murray's settlement limits offer had never been communicated to him prior to the
time Green settled with Murray. Joann Hirase also appeared and testified that the policy limits
offer had never been communicated to her prior to the time that Green settled with Murray.
Thereafter, the Court took the matter under advisement and thereafter, issued its minute
entry decision.
NOW, THEREFORE, the Court having reviewed the pleadings and having heard the
argument of counsel and being fully advised in the premises, ORDERS that the motion of plaintiff,
State Farm Mutual Insurance Company, for summary judgment is hereby granted. Specifically,
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the Court rules as follows:
1.

That the Utah insurance policies of Lora Green clearly provided a "consent to
settle" provision which reads as follows:
There is no coverage:
1.

2.

For any insured who, without our written consent, settles with any
person or organization who may be liable for the bodily injury and
thereby impairs our right to recover our payments;

That there are no genuine issues of fact as to Lora Green's breach of the above
described "consent to settle" provision and State Farm is therefore entitled to
Summary Judgment.

3.

That the above referenced "consent to settle provision" is valid;

4.

That the above referenced "consent to settle" provision required Lora Green to
obtain written consent from State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company
before settling with Marlene Murray;

5.

That Lora Green violated the above reference "consent to settle" provision of her
policy by releasing Marlene Murrayfromall liability without the written consent of
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company. Marlene Murray is the
mother of Lora Green;

6.

That the actions of Lora Green in breaching the above referenced "consent to
settle" provision impaired the rights of State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
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Company to collect any paymentsfromMarlene Murray that it may make to Lora
Green for underinsured motorist benefits;
That because of Lora Green's breach of agreement, Lora Green is not entitled to
undersinsured motorist benefits under the Utah policies based on Mrs. Murray's
underinsurance.
The Court has previously ruled in favor of Marlene Murray that the release
completely terminates her liability and potential liability to State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Company;
That plaintiffs claims to declare Murray soley at fault are moot as to the Utah
policies based on the Courts ruling;
That since thefilingof the complaint plaintiffs claim to declare Louder as not
being underinsured has been resolved by a jury verdict and judgment against Lora
Green in Lora Green v. Llovd Louder, et al Case No. 950400617, in the Fourth
Judicial District Court, Utah County, State of Utah; however, such verdict and
judgment is on appeal to the Utah Supreme Court. For the purposes of this case
and this ruling, the judgment rendered on the jury verdict in that case is considered
final unless and until overturned by an appellate decision.
This order is, therefore, intended to be afinalorder disposing of the entire case
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and judgment in favor of Plaintiff is hereby entered.
Dated this 5th day of March, 2001

Taylor
District Court

Copies of this Order mailed to:
Counsel for the Plaintiff:
Richard K. Glauser
Albert W. Gray
2180 South 1300 East, Suite 600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
Counsel for the Defendant:
L. Rich Humpherys
50 South Main Street, Suite 1500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Mailed this *J

day of / lQJ^L^2tiO\, postage pre-paid as noted above.
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Tab 3

SECTION ffl - UNINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE - COVERAGE U AND
UNDERINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE - COVERAGE W
UNINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE - COVERAGE U

a. your car, a temporary substitute car, a newly
acquired car or a trailer attached to such car.

You have this coverage if "IT appears in the "Coverages"
space on the declarations page.
We will pay damages for bodily injury an insured is legaD>
entitled to collect from the owner or driver of an uninsured
motor vehicle. The bodily injury must be caused by accident
arising out of the operation, maintenance or use of an
uninsured motor vehicle.

b

Uninsured Motor Vehicle - means:
1. a land motor vehicle, the ownership, maintenance
or use of which is:
a. not insured or bonded for bodily injury liability
at the time of the accident; or
b. insured or bonded for bodily injury liability at
the time of the accident; but
(1) the limits of liability are less than requiifd
by the financial responsibility act of 9ie
state where your car is mainly garaged; or
(2) the insuring company denies coverage or
is or becomes insolvent; or
2. an unidentified "hit-and-run" land motor vehicle
which was the proximate cause of the bodily injury.
The insured must show the existence of the other
motor vehicle by clear and convincing evidence,
which shall consist of more than the insured's
testimony.
»
An uninsured motor vehicle does not include a land motor
l
vehicle:

Such vehicle has to be used within the scope of
the consent of you or your spouse; or
a car not owned by you, your spouse or any
relative, or a trailer attached to such a car. It
has to be driven by the first person named in
the declarations or that person's spouse and
within the scope of the owner's consent

Such other person occupying a vehicle used to cany
persons for a charge is not an insured.
3. any person entitled to recover damages because of
bodily injury to an insured under 1. and 2. above.
Deciding Fault and Amount
Two questions must be decided by agreement between the
insured anAvs:
1.

2.

Is the insured legally entided to collect damages
from the owner or driver of the uninsured motor
vehicle; and
If so, in what amount?

If there is no agreement, these questions will be decided by
arbitration upon written request of the insured. Each party
shall select a competent and impartial arbitrator. These two
shall select a third one. If unable to agree on the third one
within 30 days either party may request a judge of a court
of record in the county in which the arbitration is pending
to select a third one. The written deasion of any two
arbitrators shall be binding on each party.

1. insured under the liability coverage of this policy; •
2. furnished for the regular use of you, your spouse or
any relative;
3. owned or operated by a self-insurer under any
motor vehicle finanaal responsibility law, a motor
earner law or any similar law;
4. owned by any government or any of its political
subdivisions or agencies;
5. designed for use mainly off public roads except
while on public roads; or

The cost of the arbitrator and any expert witness shall be
paid by the party who hired them. The cost of the third
arbitrator and other expenses of arbitration shall be shared
equally by both parties.

6.

UNDERINSURED
COVERAGE W

while located for use as premises.

Who Is an Insured
Insured — means the person or persons covered by
uninsured motor vehicle coverage.
This is:
1. you, your spouse and your relatives; and
2. any other person while occupying:

The arbitration shall take place in the county in which the
insured resides unless the parties agree to another place.
State court rules governing procedure and admission of
evidence shall be used.
We are not bound by any judgment against any person or
organization obtained without our written consent.
MOTOR

VEHICLE

You have this coverage if '* W" appears in the "Coverages"
space on the declarations page.
We will pay damages for bodily injury an insured is legally
entitled to collect from the owner or driver of an
underinsured motor vehicle. The bodily injury must be caused
by accident arising out of the operation, maintenance or use
of an underinsured motor vehicle.
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persons for a charge is not an insured
1. THE LIMITS OF LIABILITY OF ALL BODILY
5 any person entitled to recover damages because of
INJURY LIABILITY BONDS AND POLICIES
bodily injury to an insured under 1 through 4 above
THAT APPLY HAVE BEEN USED UP BY
PAYMENT
OF
JUDGMENTS
OR Deciding Fault and Amount
SETTLEMENTS TO OTHER PERSONS; OR
Two questions must be decided by agreement between the
2. SUCH LIMITS OF LIABILITY OR REMAINING
insured and us*
PART OF THEM HAVE BEEN OFFERED TO
THE INSURED.
1 Is the insured legally entided to collect damages
from the owner or driver of the underinsured motor
Underinsured Motor Vehicle - means a land motor vehicle
vehicle; and
1. the ownership, maintenance or use of which is insured
2. If so, in what amount?
or bonded for bodily injury liability at the time of the
If there is no agreement, these questions shall be decided by
accident; and
arbitration upon written request of the insured or us.
2. whose limits of liability for bodily injury liability:
a.

are less than the amount of the insured's damages,
or
b. have been reduced by payments to persons other
than the insured to less than the amount of the
insured's damages.

Each party shall select a competent and impartial arbitrator.
These two shall select a third one. If unable to agree on the
third one within 30 days either party may request a judge of
a court of record in the county in which the arbitration is
pending to select a third one. The written decision of any
two arbitrators shall be binding on each party.

An underinsured motor vehicle does not include a land motor The cost of the arbitrator and any expert witness shall be
vehicle:
paid by the party who hired them. The cost of the third
arbitrator
and other expenses of arbitration shall be shared
1. insured under the liability coverage of this policy;
equally by both parties.
2. furnished for the regular use of you, your spouse or any
The arbitration shall take place in the county in which the
relative;
iAsured
resides unless the parties agree to another place.
3. owned by any government or any of its political
Sfete
court
rules governing procedure and admission of
subdivisions or agencies;
evidence shall be used,
c
4. designed for use mainly off public roads except while
We are not bound by any judgment against any person or
on public roads;
5. Awhile located for use as premises; or
organization obtained without our written consent
6. defined as an "uninsured motor vehicle" in your policy. Payment of Any Amount Due — Coverages U and W
Who Is an Insured
Insured — means the person or persons covered by
underinsured motor vehicle coverage:
This is:
L The first person named in the declarations;
2. his or her spouse;
3. their relatives; and
4. any other person while occupying;
a. your car, a temporary substitute car, a newly
acquired car, or a trailer attached to such car.
Such vehicle has to be used within the scope of
the consent ofyou or your spouse; or
b. a car not owned by you, your spouse or any
relative, or a trailer attached to such a car. It
has to be driven by the first person named in
the declarations or that person's spouse and
within the scope of the owner's consent

We will pay any amount due:
1. to the insured;
2. to a parent or guardian if the insured is a minor or
an incompetent person;
3. to the surviving spouse; or
4. at our option, to a person authorized by law to
receive such payment
Limits of Liability - Coverage U
1. The amount of coverage is shown on the declarations
page under "Limits of Liability - U - Each Person,
Each Accident". Under "Each Person" is the amount
of coverage for all damages due to bodily injury to one
person. "RodUy injury to one person" includes all injury
and damages to others resulting from this bodily injury.
Under "Each Accident" is the total amount of
coverage, subject to the amount shown under "Each
Person", for ail damages due to bodily injury to two or
more persons in the same accident

1

2

Any amount payable under this coverage shall be
reduced by any amount paid or payable to or for the
insured:
a. by or for any person or organization who is or may
be held legally liable for the bodily injury to the
insured; or
b. for bodily injury under the liability coverage
3. Any payment made to a person under this coverage
shallreduceany amount payable to that person under
the bodily injury liability coverage
4. Any amount paid or payable under
a. the no-fault coverage; or
b. any worker's compensation, disability benefits, or
similar law
will not be paid for again as damages under this
coverage. This does notreducethe limits of liability of
this coverage.
5. The limits of liability are not increased because
a. more than one vehicle is insured under this policy;
or
b. more than one person is insured at the time of the
accident
Limits of Liability — Coverage W

b

who is or may be held legally liable for the bodily
injury; or
the limits of liability of this coverage

When Coverage U Does Not Apply
THERE IS NO COVERAGE
1

2

FOR ANY INSURED WHO, WITHOUT OUR
WRITTEN CONSENT, SETTLES WITH ANY
PERSON OR ORGANIZATION WHO MAY BE
LIABLE FOR THE BODIL Y INJUR Y.
FOR BODILY INJURYTO AN INSURED:
a WHILE OCCUPYING, OR
b THROUGH BEING STRUCK BY

A MOTOR VEHICLE OWNED BY YOU, YOUR
SPOUSE OR ANY RELATIVE IF IT IS NOT
INSURED FOR THIS COVERAGE UNDER THIS
POLICY.
3. TO THE EXTENT IT BENEFITS.
a. ANY WORKER'S COMPENSATION OR
DISABILITY
BENEFITS
INSURANCE
COMPANY.
b. A
SELF-INSURER
UNDER
ANY
WORKER'S
COMPENSATION,
OR
DISABILITY BENEFITS OR SIMILAR LAW.
c. ANY
GOVERNMENTAL
BODY OR
AGENCY.

1. The amount of coverage is shown on the declarations
page under "Limits of Liability - W - Each Person,
Each Accident". Under "Each Person" is the amount
of coverage for all damages due to bodily injury to onp When Coverage W Does Not Apply
person. Under "Each Accident" is the total amount of
coverage, subject to the amount shown under "Eacfi THERE IS NO COVERAGE:
Person", for all damages due to bodily injury to two or 1. FOR ANY INSURED WHO, WITHOUT OUR
more persons in the same accident.
WRITTEN CONSENT, SETTLES WITH ANY
2. Any amount paid or payable under
PERSON OR ORGANIZATION WHO MAY BE
LIABLE FOR THE BODILY INJURY AND
a. the no-fault coverage; or
THEREBY
IMPAIRS OUR RIGHT TO RECOVER
b. any worker's compensation, disability benefits or
OUR
PAYMENTS.
similar law
will not be paid for again as damages under this 2. FOR BODILYINJURYTO ANY INSURED:
a. WHILE OCCUPYING, OR
coverage. This does notreducethe limits of liability of
this coverage
b. THROUGH BEING STRUCK BY
3. Any payment made to a person under this coverage
A MOTOR VEHICLE OWNED BY YOU, YOUR
shall reduce any amount payable to that person for
SPOUSE OR ANY RELATIVE IF IT IS NOT
bodily injury under the liability coverage.
INSURED FOR THIS COVERAGE UNDER THIS
4. The limits of liability are not increased because.
POLICY.
a. more than one vehicle is insured under this policy;
TO THE EXTENT IT BENEFITS:
b. more than one person is insured at the time of the
a. ANY WORKER'S COMPENSATION OR
accident; or
DISABILITY
BENEFITS
INSURANCE
COMPANY.
c. more than one underinsured motor vehicle is
involved in the same accident.
b. A
SELF-INSURER
UNDER
ANY
WORKER'S
COMPENSATION,
OR
5. The most we pay will be the lesser of.
DISABILITY
BENEFITS
OR
SIMILAR
LAW.
a. the difference between the amount of the insured's
c. ANY
GOVERNMENTAL
BODY
OR
damages for bodily injury, and the amount paid to
the insured by or for any person or organization
AGENCY.
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4.

5.

6.

FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES OR INTEREST
AWARDED TO OR CLAIMED BY THE
INSURED.
FOR ANY PERSON WHOSE CLAIM FOR
BODILY INJURY ARISES OUT OF BODILY
/A7£//?FSUSTAINED BY ANOTHER PERSON
FOR COSTS OR ATTORNEY FEES INCURRED
BY, ON BEHALF OF, OR AWARDED TO THE
INSURED.

b

2

If There Is Other Uninsured Motor Vehicle Coverage
1.

Regardless of the number of motor vehicles involved,
the number of persons covered Or claims made, vehicles
or premiums shown in the policy or premiums paid, the
limit of liability for uninsured motor vehicle coverage
shall not be added to or stacked upon limits for such
3
coverage applying to other motor vehicles to determine
the amount of coverage available to an insured injured
in any one accident.
2. If the insured sustains bodily injury and other uninsured
motor vehicle coverage applies:
a. the insured must elect one policy under which to
make a claim; and
b. COVERAGE UNDER THIS POLICY DOES
NOT APPLY IF THE INSURED ELECTS ANY
OTHER UNINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE
COVERAGE UNDER WHICH TO MAKE A
CLAIM.
3. TTHS COVERAGE DOES NOT APPLY IF THERE
IS OTHER UNINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE
COVERAGE ON A NEWLY ACQUIRED CAR.
If There Is Other Underinsured Motor Vehicle Coverage
1.

If the insured sustains bodily i^wy as a pedestrian and
other underinsured motor vehicle coverage applies:
a. the total limits of liability under all such coverages
shall not exceed that of the coverage with the
highest limit of liability; and

4
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we are liable only for our share. Our share is that
per cent of the damages that the limit of liability of
this coverage bears to the total of all undennsured
motor vehicle coverage applicable to the accident.
If the insured sustains bodily injury while occupying your
car, and your car is described on the declarations page
of another policy providing underinsured motor vehicle
coverage:
a. the total limits of liability under all such coverages
shall not exceed that of the coverage with the
highest limit of liability; and
b. we are liable only for our share. Our share is that
per cent of the damages that the limit of liability of
this coverage bears to the total of all such
underinsured motor vehicle coverage applicable to
the accident
If the insured sustains bodily injury while occupying a
vehicle not owned by you, your spouse or any relative,
this coverage applies:
a. as excess to any underinsured motor vehicle
coverage which applies to the vehicle as primary
coverage, but
b. only in the amount by which it exceeds the primary
coverage.
If coverage under more than one policy applies as
excess:
a. the total limit of liability shall not exceed-the
difference between the limit of liability of the
coverage that applies as primary and the highest
limit of liability of any one of die coverages that
apply as excess; and
b. we are liable only for our share. Our share is that
per cent of the damages that the limit of liability of
this coverage bears to the total of all underinsured
motor vehicle coverage applicable as excess to the
accident.
THIS COVERAGE DOES NOT APPLY IF THERE
IS OTHER UNDERINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE
COVERAGE ON A NEWLY ACQUIRED CAR.
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31A-22-302. Required components of motor vehicle insurance policies — Exceptions.
(1) Every policy of insurance or combination of policies
purchased to satisfy the owner's or operator's security requirement of Section 41-12a-301 shall include:
(a) motor vehicle liability coverage under Sections 31A22-303 and 31A-22-304;
(b) uninsured motorist coverage under Section 31A-22305, unless affirmatively waived under Subsection 31A22-305(4); and
(c) underinsured motorist coverage under Section 31A22-305, unless affirmatively waived under Subsection
31A-22-305(8)(c).
(2) Every policy of insurance or combination of policies,
purchased to satisfy the owner's or operator's security requirement of Section 41-12a-301, except for motorcycles, trailers,
and semitrailers, shall also include personal injury protection
under Sections 31A-22-306 thrpugh 31A-22-309.
(3) First party medical coverages may be offered or included
in policies issued to motorcycle, trailer, and semitrailer owners
or operators. Owners and operators of motorcycles, trailers,
and semitrailers are not covered by personal iryury protection
coverages in connection with injuries incurred while operating
any of these vehicles.
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Tab 5

31A-22-S05. Uninsured and underinsured motorist
coverage.
(1) As used in this section, "covered persons" includes:
(a) the named insured;
(b) persons related to the named insured by blood,
marriage, adoption, or guardianship, who are residents of
the named insured's household, including those who usually make their home tin the same household but temporarily live elsewhere;
(c) any person occupying or using a motor vehicle
referred to in the policy or owned by a self-insurer; and
(d) any person who is entitled to recover damages
against the owner or operator of the uninsured or
underinsured motor vehicle because of bodily injury to or
death of persons under Subsection (lXa), (b), or (c).'
(2) As used in this section, "uninsured motor vehicle" includes:
(a) (i) a vehicle, the operation, maintenance, or use of
which is not covered under a liability policy at the
time of an iiyuiy-causing occurrence; or
(ii) (A) a vehicle covered with lower liability limits
than required by Section 31A-22-304;
(B) the vehicle described in Subsection
(2XaXiiXA) is uninsured to the extent of the
deficiency;
(b) an unidentified vehicle that left the scene of an
accident proximately caused by the vehicle operator; or
(c) (i) an insured vehicle if, before or after the accident,
the liability insurer of the vehicle is declared insolvent by a court of competent jurisdiction;
(ii) the vehicle described in Subsection (2XcXi) is
uninsured only to the extent that the claim against
the insolvent insurer is not paid by a guaranty
association or fund.
(3) Uninsured motorist coverage under Subsection 31A-22302(lXb) provides coverage for covered persons who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of
uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness,
disease, or death in limits that at least equal the minimum
bodily injury limits for motor vehicle liability policies under
Section 31A-22-304.
(4) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (4Xb), the named
insured may reject uninsured motorist coverage by an
express writing to the insurer that provides liability
coverage under Subsection 31A-22-302(lXa). This rejection continues for that issuer of the liability coverage until
the insured in writing requests uninsured motorist coverage from that liability insurer.
(b) All persons, including governmental entities, that
are engaged in the business of, or that accept payment for,
transporting natural persons by motor vehicle, and all
school districts that provide transportation services for
their students, shall provide coverage for all vehicles used
for that purpose, by purchase of a policy of insurance or by

self-insurance, uninsured motorist coverage of at least
$25,000 per person and $500,000 per accident.
(i) This coverage is secondary to any other insurance covering an injured covered person.
(ii) This coverage does not apply to an employee,
who is injured by an uninsured motorist, whose
exclusive remedy is provided by Title 35, Chapter 1,
Workers' Compensation,
(c) As used in this subsection:
(i) "Governmental entity* has the same meaning
as under Section 63-30-2.
(ii) "Motor vehicle" has the same meaning as under
Section 41-la-102.
(5) When a covered person alleges that an uninsured motor
vehicle under Subsection (2Kb) proximately caused an accident without touching the covered person or the vehicle
occupied by the covered person, the covered person must show
the existence of the uninsured motor vehicle by clear and
convincing evidence consisting of more than the covered
person's testimony.
(6) (a) The limit of liability for uninsured motorist coverage
for two or more motor vehicles may not be added together,
combined, or stacked to determine the limit of insurance
coverage available to an injured person for any one
accident.
(b) (i) Subsection (a) applies to all persons except a
covered person as defined under Subsection (7XbXii).
(ii) A covered person as defined under Subsection
(7XbXii) is entitled to the highest limits of uninsured
motorist coverage afforded for any one vehicle that
the covered person is the named insured or an insured family member.
(iii) This coverage shall be in addition to the coverage on the vehicle the covered person is occupying.
(iv) Neither the primary nor the secondary coverage may be set off against the other.
(c) Coverage on a motor vehicle occupied at the time of
an accident shall be primary coverage, and the coverage
elected by a person described under Subsections (lXa) and
(b) shall be secondary coverage.
(7) (a) Uninsured motorist coverage under this section applies to bodily injury, sickness, disease, or death of covered
persons while occupying or using a motor vehicle only if
the motor vehicle is described in the policy under which a
claim is made, or if the motor vehicle is a newly acquired
or replacement vehicle covered under the terms of the
policy. Except as provided in Subsection (6) or (7), a
covered person injured in a vehicle described in a policy
that includes uninsured motorist benefits may not elect to
collect uninsured motorist coverage benefits from any
other motor vehicle insurance policy under which he is a
covered person.

(b) Each of the following persons may also recover
uninsured motorist benefits under any other policy in
which they are described as a "covered person9 as defined
in Subsection (1):
(i) a covered person injured as a pedestrian by an
uninsured motor vehicle; and
(ii) a covered person injured while occupying or
using a motor vehicle that is not owned by furnished,
or available for the regular use of the covered person,
the covered person's resident spouse, or the covered
person's resident relative.
(c) A covered person in Subsection (7Xb) is not barred
against making subsequent elections if recovery is unavailable under previous elections.
(8) (a) As used in this section, "underinsured motor vehicle" includes a vehicle, the operation, maintenance, or
use of which is covered under a liability policy at the time
of an iiyury-causing occurrence, but which has insufficient liability coverage to compensate fully the iryured
party for all special and general damages.
(b) The term "underinsured motor vehicle" does not
include:
(i) a motor vehicle that is covered under the liability coverage of the same policy that also contains the
underinsured motorist coverage; or
(ii) an uninsured motor vehicle as defined in Subsection (2).
(9) (a) Underinsured motorist coverage under Subsection
31A-22-302(lXc) provides coverage for covered persons
who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners
or operators of underinsured motor vehicles because of
bodily injury, sickness, disease, or death in limits of at
least $10,000 for one person in any one accident, and at
least $20,000 for two or more persons in any one accident.
(b) The named insured's underinsured motorist coverage, as described in Subsection (9Xa), is secondary to the
liability coverage of an owner or operator of an
underinsured motor vehicle, as described in Subsection
(8). Underinsured motorist coverage may not be set off
against the liability coverage of the owner or operator of
an underinsured motor vehicle, but shall be added to,
combined with, or stacked upon the liability coverage of
the owner or operator of the underinsured motor vehicle
to determine the limit of coverage available to the injured
person.
(c) (i) For new policies or contracts written after January 1, 1993, a named insured may reject
underinsured motorist coverage by an express writing to the insurer that provides liability coverage
under Subsection 31A-22-302 (lXa). This rejection
continues for that issuer of the liability coverage until
the insured in writing requests underinsured motorist coverage from that liability insurer.

(ii) In conjunction with the first three renewal
notices sent after January 1,1993, for policies existing on that date, the insurer shall notify the insured
of the availability of underinsured motorist coverage
along with estimated ranges of premiums for the
coverage. The department shall provide standard
language to be used by insurers to fidfill the insurers'
duty under this subsection.
(10) (a) Underinsiired motorist coverage under this section
applies to bodily injury, sickness, disease, or death of an
insured while occupying or using a motor vehicle owned ,
by, furnished, or available for the regular use of the
insured, a resident spouse, or resident relative of the
insured, only if the motor vehicle is described in the policy
under which a claim is made, or if the motor vehicle is a
newly acquired or replacement vehicle covered under the
terms of the policy. Except as provided in Subsection (10),
a covered person injured in a vehicle described in a policy
that includes underinsured motorist benefits may not
elect to collect underinsured motorist coverage benefits
from any other motor vehicle insurance policy under
which he is a named insured.
(b) (i) The limit of liability for underinsured motorist
coverage for two or more motor vehicles may not be
added together, combined, or stacked to determine
the limit of insurance coverage available to an injured
person for any one accident.
(ii) Subsection, (bXi) applies to all persons except a
covered person as defined under Subsection (cXiXB).
(iii) Coverage on a motor vehicle occupied at the
time of an accident shall be primary coverage, and
the coverage elected by a person described under
Subsections dXa) and (b) shall be secondary coverage,
(c) (i) Each of the following persons may also recover
underinsured motorist coverage benefits under any
other policy in which they are described as a "covered
person" as defined under Subsection (1):
(A) a covered person injured as a pedestrian
by an underinsured motor vehicle; or
(B) a covered person iiyured while occupying
or using a motor vehicle that is not owned by,
furnished, or available for the regular use of the
covered person, the covered person's resident
spouse, or the covered person's resident relative.
(ii) This coverage shall only be available as a
secondary source of coverage.
(iii) A covered person as defined under Subsection
(c)(iXB) is entitled to the highest limits of
underinsured motorist coverage afforded for any one
vehicle that the covered person is the named insured
or an insured family member.
(iv) This coverage shall be in addition to the coverage on the vehicle the covered person is occupying.
(v) Neither the primary nor the secondary coverage may be set off against the other.
(d) A covered injured person is not barred against
making subsequent elections if recovery is unavailable
under nrevious elections.
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CONDITIONS
1. Policy Changes
3.
a. Policy Terms The terms of this policy may be
changed or waived only by*
(1) an endorsement signed by one of our executive
officers; or
(2) the revision of this policy form to give broader
coverage without an extra charge. If any
coverage you carry is changed to give broader
coverage, we will give you the broader coverage
without the issuance of a new policy as of the
date we make the change effective.
b. Change of Interest. No change of interest in this
policy is effective unless *e consent in writing
However, if you die, we will protect as named
insured, except under death, dismemberment and
loss of sight coverage:
(1) your surviving spouse;
(2) any person with proper custody of your car, a
newly acquired car or a temporary substitute car
until a legal representative is qualified; and then
(3) the legalrepresentativewhile acting within the
scope of his or her duties.
Policy notice requirements are met by mailing the
notice to the deceased named insured's last known
address.
c. Consent of Beneficiary. Consent of the bejiefteiary
under death, dismemberment and loss of sight
coverage is not needed to cancel or change the
policy.
d. Joint and Individual Interests. When there,are two
or more named insureds, each acts for all to cancel
or change the policy.
2. Suit Against Us
There is no right of action against us:
a. until aD the terms of this policy have been met; and
b. under the liability coverage, until the amount of
damages an insured is legally liable to pay has been
finally determined by:
(1) judgment after actual trial, and appeal if any;
or
(2) agreement between the insured, the claimant
and us.
4
Bankruptcy or insolvency of the insured or his or
her estate shall not relieve us of our obligations.
c.

under all other coverages until the earlier of:
(1) 60 days after we receive proof of loss;
(2) our waiver of proof of loss; or
(3) our denial of full payment.

Our Right to Recover Our Payments
a
b

Death, dismemberment and loss of sight coverage
payments are notrecoverableby us.
Under uninsured motor vehicle coverage:
(1) we are subrogated to the extent of our
payments to the proceeds of any settlement the
injured person recovers from any party bable
for the bodily injury.
(2) if the person to or for whom we have made
payment has not recovered from the party at
fault, he or she shall:
(a) keep these rights in trust for us;
(b) execute any legal papers we need; and
(c) when we ask, take action through our
representative torecoverour payments.

We are to be repaid our payments, costs and
fees of collection out of any recovery.
c. Under no-fault coverage we are entitled to recover
our payments in accord with Utah law.
d. Under underinsured motor vehicle coverage:
(1) we are entitled, to the extent of our payments,
to the proceeds of any setdement the insured
recovers from any party liable for the bodily
injury, other than payments from bodily injury
liability bonds or policies made prior to our
payment.
(2) if the insured has not been fully compensated
for the bodily injury by the party at fault and
we make payment for the bodily injury, the
insured shall:
(a) keep theserightsin trust for us:
(b) execute any legal papers we need; and
(c) when we ask, take action through our
representative to recover the amount of
our payments.
We are to be repaid our payments, costs and
fees of collection out of any such recovery
e. Under all other coverages the right of recovery of
any party we pay passes to us. Such party shall.
(1) not hurt our rights to recover, and
(2) help us get our money back.
Cancellation
How You May Cancel. You may cancel your policy by
notifying us in writing of the date to cancel, which must
be later than the date you mail or deliver it to us. We
may waive these requirements by confirming the date
and time of cancellation to you in writing.
How and When We May Cancel. We may cancel your
policy by written notice, mailed to your last known
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